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This brief, submitted by the Utah Self-Insurers'
Association1 in support of Petitioners' request for a Writ of
Certiorari, hereby incorporates the briefs submitted by Young
Electric Sign Company (the employer) and The Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah (an amicus curiae).

While the core concern of the

employer's and amicus' briefs is the same, slightly different
issues are addressed in the respective briefs so that they can be
read as a whole without undue repetition.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant

Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule
46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds
that the Utah Court of Appeals' decisions in Crosland v.
Industrial Commission 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992)
("Crosland") and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330
(Utah App. 1990) directly conflict.
2.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant

Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule
46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds
that (a) Crosland applies a standard of review contrary to and in
*The Utah Self-Insurers' Association is a non-profit
organization comprised of Utah's major self-insured employers,
including (to name a few) AT&T Communications of the Mountain
States, Inc.; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints; Chevron,
U.S.A.; Intermountain Health Care Inc.; Kennecott-Utah Copper
Division; Morton International; Roadway Services, Inc.; Thiokol
Corporation; US West Communications; and Utah Transit Authority.

conflict with the standard of review established by the Utah
Supreme Court in Morton v. Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991), and (b) Crosland treats asymptomatic conditions in a way
that directly conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of
asymptomatic conditions in Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986).
3.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant

Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds
that Crosland radically departs from long-standing Industrial
Commission practice by defining the term "permanent impairment"
in a way that excludes objectively identifiable but asymptomatic
medical conditions.
4.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant

Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule
46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds
that Crosland treats an issue of first impression in this
jurisdiction and profoundly disrupts the deep-seated public
policy objective (established by the state legislature, the
Industrial Commission and the Utah Supreme Court) of encouraging
Utah employers to hire workers with disabilities and impairments
by establishing a fair basis for apportioning workers
compensation disability awards.
2

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In filing their briefs supporting the requested
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, petitioners and amicus curiae
seek review of the Utah Court of Appeals7 March 20, 1992 decision
in Crosland v. Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah
App. 1992).

(See Addendum "A.")
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Jurisdiction to issue the requested Petition for Writ
of Certiorari is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Article
VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)
and 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended); and, Rule 45, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 and § 63-46b-16 (1953 as
amended) are controlling and are attached as Addendum "B"
The controlling rule is Rule 46, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
The controlling medical definition of "permanent
impairment" from the American Medical Association Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1988) is attached as Addendum
"C."

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This brief incorporates by reference the Case and Fact
Statements contained in Young Electric Sign Company's brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS IN CROSLAND AND
NYREHN DIRECTLY CONFLICT.
Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioning
party's request for a Writ of Certiorari when opinions rendered
by different panels of the Utah Court of Appeals are in conflict.
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted in the present case,
pursuant to Rule 46(a), because the Utah Court of Appeals'
decisions in Crosland v. Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800
P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990) (attached as Addendum

f,,

D") directly

conflict.
In Crosland, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a
worker's asymptomatic preexisting condition cannot be used by the
Utah Industrial Commission to apportion a permanent partial
disability award between the worker's industrially-caused
impairment and any impairment arising from the worker's
4

asymptomatic preexisting condition.

Under Crosland, the worker's

employer must compensate the worker for his industrially-caused
impairment and for any impairment assignable to the worker's
asymptomatic (but objectively identifiable) preexisting
condition.
Conversely, in Nyrehn, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded an
applicant's claim and expressly directed the Industrial
Commission to apportion its disability award between the
applicant's industrially caused injury and asymptomatic
preexisting condition.2

Clearly, the remand order in Nyrehn and

the holding in Crosland are at odds.3

The Utah Supreme Court

should grant the petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict between the Utah Court of Appeals'
apportionment rulings.

2

Significantly, the asymptomatic preexisting spondylolysis
condition in Nyrehn is exactly the same asymptomatic preexisting
condition involved in this case.
3

Even though Nyrehn dealt with a permanent total disability
claim, whereas Crosland involves a permanent partial disability
claim, the two decisions nevertheless fundamentally conflict
because they treat the same asymptomatic preexisting condition in
diametrically opposite ways.
5

POINT II
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 8HOULD BE GRANTED
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN CROSLAND
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS
IN MORTON AND HOLLOWAY.
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's
request for a Writ of Certiorari when "a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court."

In

the present case, a Writ of Certiorari should be granted pursuant
to Rule 46(b) for two reasons.

First, the Writ should be granted

because the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Crosland both
misconstrues and misapplies the standard of review criteria set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Morton v. Tax Commission. 814
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

Second, the Writ should be granted because

the Crosland decision treats asymptomatic conditions in a way
that directly conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of
asymptomatic conditions in Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986).
A.

Conflict with Morton.

In Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)f
this Court held that administrative cases initiated after January
1, 1988 would be subject to review by Utah's appellate courts
6

under the standards articulated in the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA) , Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988).
583.

Id. at

Under UAPA, this Court stated that an administrative

agency's interpretation of a statutory term—like the term
"permanent impairment" contained in Utah's Workers Compensation
Act—will be given deference if there exists "an explicit or
implicit grant of discretion . . . in the governing statute."
Id. at 588.

This Court then observed that in determining whether

to apply a deferential standard of review:
. . .what has developed as the dispositive
factor is whether the agency, by virtue of
its experience or expertise, is in a better
position than the courts to give effect to
the regulatory objective to be achieved.
[Accordingly]. . .in the absence of a
discernable legislative intent concerning the
specific question in issue, a choice among
permissible interpretations of a statute is
largely a policy determination. The agency
that has been granted authority to administer
the statute is the body to make such a
determination. . . .[A]n appellate court
should not substitute its judgment for the
agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of
the agency's policy. In such a case, it is
appropriate to conclude that the legislature
has delegated authority to the agency to
decide the issue. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 586, 589.
The Crosland decision wholly fails to apply the
foregoing standard of review to the facts of this case.

Crosland

does properly acknowledge that Morton is the law governing the
7

standard of review.

Crosland even acknowledges, in footnote two

of the decision, the implied grant of discretion inquiry (quoted
above) pertinent to this case.
are mere lipservice.

However, these acknowledgements

Having made the cursory acknowledgments,

Crosland tautologically declares that "[t]his case requires an
interpretation of the 1988 amendment to the Workers Compensation
Act and thus presents a question of statutory construction and
legislative intent which we may review for correctness."
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.

183

The Crosland panel is clearly mistaken.

Crosland should be reviewed and reversed on the grounds that (1)
the decision ignores the language from Morton quoted above, and
(2) the decision makes no attempt to discern any express or
implied legislative grant of authority.
1.

Crosland Ignores Morton's Implied Intent Mandate.

In analyzing Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-66 (1988), the
Crosland court was apparently unable to discern any express or
implied grant of legislative discretion to the Industrial
Commission.

Given this inability, the Crosland court was obliged

to defer to the Industrial Commission's interpretation of
"permanent impairment," because, as this Court observed in
Morton, "in the absence of a discernable legislative intent
concerning the specific question in issue. . . rt"|he agency that
has been granted authority to administer the statute is the body
8

to make such a determination, . . . fand] filn such a case, it is
appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated
authority to the agency to decide the issue."
Id. at 589.

[Emphasis added.]

The Utah Court of Appeals completely side-stepped

this Supreme Court directive in conducting its standard of review
analysis.

On this basis, Crosland directly conflicts with Morton

and should be reversed.
2.

Crosland Fails to Discern the Legislative Grant of
Discretion to the Industrial Commission.

Crosland should also be reviewed and reversed on the
basis that the Utah Workers Compensation statute affords both an
express and an implied grant of discretion to the Utah Industrial
Commission to arrive at definitions for medical terms of art like
"permanent impairment."4

When the Utah Workers Compensation Act

is read as a whole, the legislature has, at a minimum, granted
the Industrial Commission discretion to apply its expertise in:
a. Determining the amount of permanent
partial disability compensation to be
4

This Court has routinely held that the Utah Industrial
Commission and other administrative agencies are afforded
deference as they exercise their unique expertise in fairly
evaluating the factors that comprise compensable claims. See,
e.g., Savage Brothers, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 723 P.2d
1085 (Utah 1986) (discretion given agency's interpretation of
ambiguous or technical terms); Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767 P.2d
524 (Utah 1988); Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427
(Utah 1986) (Commission given discretion to interpret a statute when
its expertise gives it the best position from which to view the
statute).
9

"awarded by the commission based on the
medical evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 35-166.
b. Establishing disability compensation
using an average weekly wage method or
"such other method" to be determined by the
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-75(1)
(g)(iii);
c. Determining compensability issues
utilizing "a medical panel appointed by the
Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(a);
d. Adjudicating the medical aspects of a
controverted case utilizing a medical
director or medical consultants which "the
Commission in its sole discretion may
employ." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(d);
e. Directing the medical panel appointed by
an administrative law judge to render its
medical report "in writing to the Commission
in a form prescribed by the Commission."
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(b); and
f. Rendering its decision on the medical
aspects of a controverted case based upon
either the findings of the medical pan€*l or
other substantial conflicting evidence in the
case. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(d).5
Based on the overall legislative framework of the Utah
Workers Compensation statute and this Court's past recognition of
discretion granted to the Commission, the Crosland court erred in

5

Under Morton, a phrase like "as determined by the Commission"
is an indication of an express grant of discretion by the
legislature. 814 P.2d at 588 f.n. 40. Crosland fails to even
consider the existence of such statutory language contained in
Utah's Workers Compensation Act.
10

failing to defer to the Industrial Commission's interpretation of
the medical term "permanent impairment."

The court should have

applied an abuse of discretion standard of review when assessing
how the Industrial Commission should define a medical term of art
like "permanent impairment."

If the Court of Appeals had

properly deferred to the Industrial Commission's expertise, the
Court would have affirmed the Commission's disability award
without hesitation.

This is precisely the result that should now

be achieved as the Utah Supreme Court reviews and reverses
Crosland.
B.

Conflict with Holloway.

The Utah Supreme Court, by virtue of the concurring
opinions of Justices Zimmerman and Howe in Holloway v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986), has specifically indicated
that entirely latent, undetectable, asymptomatic preexisting
conditions, when aggravated by an industrial injury, clearly
trigger the higher legal causation analysis under Allen v.
Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

The existence of

a latent preexisting condition (which can be discovered by means
of objective medical tests) is critical in a legal causation
analysis, because, in Justice Zimmerman's words:
. . .the [important] question is whether the
worker came to the workplace with a condition
that increased his risk of injury. If he did
and that condition contributed to the injury,
11

then Allen's higher standard of legal
causation comes into play so as to place that
worker on the same footing as one who did not
come to work with a preexisting condition.
• • •

To rule otherwise would create the strong
likelihood that a worker who has a
preexisting condition and whose virtually
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at
work will be able to foist the cost of that
injury on his employer when the workplace had
little to do with causing the injury.
729 P.2d at 32. The public policy concern underpinning Justice
Zimmerman's pronouncement is that Utah employers should be
encouraged to hire individuals with preexisting disabilities and
impairments.

See, Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610

P.2d 334 (Utah 1980).
Ignoring Justice Zimmerman's (and the Utah Supreme
Court's) public policy concerns, the Utah Court of Appeals'
analysis in Crosland proclaims that asymptomatic preexisting
conditions are of no relevance in apportioning a permanent
partial disability award.

According to Crosland, Utah employers

are to be held liable for their employees' medically identifiable
asymptomatic preexisting conditions when those conditions
directly contribute to the employees' industrial injuries.

This

holding completely undermines Justice Zimmerman's directive as to
how asymptomatic preexisting conditions are to be handled.
Crosland should be reviewed by this Court and reversed because it

12

runs counter to both the legal analysis and the public policy
advanced in Holloway.

POINT III
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(c) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE CROSLAND RADICALLY ALTERS
LONG-STANDING INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PRACTICE.
Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's
request for Writ of Certiorari when "a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision."

A Writ of

Certiorari should be granted in the present case pursuant to Rule
46(c) because the Crosland opinion has completely departed from
the long-standing and well-accepted practice at the Industrial
Commission of apportioning permanent partial disability awards
between asymptomatic preexisting conditions and industriallycaused impairments.6

^he Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, as an amicus curiae,
has set forth the historical practice before the Industrial
Commission in its Certiorari brief.
The Utah Self-Insurers'
Association incorporates that section of the Workers Compensation
Fund's brief by reference.
13

As this Court reviews the Workers Compensation Fund's
explanation of the historical practice before the Industrial
Commission, and the legislative intent underlying the 1988
amendment to § 35-1-66, it is vital for the Court to recognize
how far the Crosland opinion has departed from the Industrial
Commission's attempt to achieve consistency in analyzing
permanent impairment issues in a variety of contexts.

To fully

understand the Industrial Commission's concern in this regard,
the Supreme Court needs to recognize (1) what the term "permanent
impairment" has meant to the Industrial Commission, and to all
practitioners before the Industrial Commission, prior to
Crosland, (b) the three major contexts in which the term
"permanent impairment" has been consistently applied by the
Industrial Commission, and (c) the explosion of litigation that
will result because Crosland's definition of "permanent
impairment" completely undermines the Industrial Commission's
heretofore consistent and fair application of Utah's Workers
Compensation law.
A.

Definition of Permanent Impairment.

As discussed in the Certiorari Brief submitted by
petitioner Young Electric Sign Company, the term "permanent
impairment" is a medical term of art, defined only by qualified
medical practitioners.

For decades, those practitioners have
14

concluded that a permanent impairment can be assessed and rated
on the basis of either a medical condition which results in
impaired functioning or a completely asymptomatic physiological
abnormality.7

(See the AMA Guides definition attached as

Addendum "C")

Clearly, the Crosland panel overstepped the

bounds of judicial restraint in attempting to redefine a medical
term of art which (1) they are not qualified to define, and
(2) which has already been defined by the American Medical
Association, and followed by the Utah Industrial Commission for
many years.

On this basis alone the Crosland decision can and

should be reversed.
B.

Consistent Application of the Term "Permanent
Impairment."

Using the medically established definition for
"permanent impairment" (outlined above), the Utah Industrial
Commission is daily faced with the task of consistently applying
the term in three primary arenas —

(1) the assessment of whether

an applicant's claim meets the higher standard of legal causation

7

The Crosland court fails to distinguish the term "impairment"
from the term "disability" when the court equates "permanent
impairment" with "some deterioration or diminishment in function."
183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. As the AMA Guides (Addendum "C")
explain, "'impairment' means an alteration of an individual's
health status that is assessed by medical means. . . .Impairment
gives rise to [functional] disability only when the medical
condition limits the individual's capacity to meet demands that
pertain to non-medical fields and activities." Guides, p. 2.
15

under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),
(2) permanent partial disability claims under Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-66, and (3) permanent total disability claims under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-69.

In all three areas, the Industrial

Commission has, for years, consistently applied the term
"permanent impairment" to include both functional preexisting
impairments, and latent asymptomatic preexisting conditions.
(See footnote 6, supra.)

The Crosland opinion completely

disrupts the Industrial Commission's heretofore consistent
application of the term.
After Crosland, the Industrial Commission is left with
the prospect of applying one meaning of "permanent impairment"
(and "asymptomatic condition") to the higher legal causation
analysis (pursuant to Holloway, supra), while applying a
completely different definition of "permanent impairment" in its
analysis of a permanent partial disability claim.

An application

of different definitions for the same medical term of art makes
absolutely no sense and will lead to burgeoning confusion and
inconsistency in Industrial Commission adjudication of workers
compensation claims.
The inconsistency and confusion in Industrial
Commission practice spawned by Crosland will be increased when
the Commission is faced with the question of whether the
16

Ho1Iowav analysis of asymptomatic conditions or the Crosland
asymptomatic condition analysis applies in the context of
permanent total disability claims.8 Again, the same treatment of
asymptomatic conditions (and the same definition of "permanent
impairment") should apply across the board, whether a claim
qualifies as a permanent partial disability claim or permanent
total disability claim.

The confusion arising from inconsistent

definitions applicable to the same medical term of art cannot be
allowed to stand.

Crosland should be taken up on certiorari and

reversed.
C

The Explosion of Litigation.

As noted above, the Crosland decision has now opened
the floodgates for an invidious form of Industrial Commission
litigation which has previously been prevented by a unified
definition of "permanent impairment."

Following Crosland.

counsel for injured employees will argue that the higher legal
causation standard under Allen cannot be triggered by the
existence of an asymptomatic preexisting condition because our
very own Utah Court of Appeals has held that such a condition
8

Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69, the Employers Reinsurance Fund
shares liability with the employer in permanent total disability
cases provided the claimant has "at least a 10% whole person
permanent impairment from any cause or origin . . . ."
The
Industrial Commission must now puzzle over whether a Holloway or
Crosland analysis of asymptomatic preexisting conditions should
apply to § 35-1-69.
17

cannot be the basis for apportionment of a permanent partial
disability claim.
The explosion in Industrial Commission litigation will
also be fueled by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's assertion
that the Crosland definition of "permanent impairment" must apply
in permanent total disability cases as well as in permanent
partial disability cases.

Prior to Crosland. the administrator

of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund routinely accepted
apportionment on the basis of an injured employee's asymptomatic
preexisting condition.

Crosland has changed this practice.

Employers will be now responsible for the payment of all of an
employee's permanent total disability claim despite the existence
of a profound (and often "eggshell") asymptomatic preexisting
condition.

Crosland's likely effect on the volume and intensity

of Industrial Commission litigation, not to mention its impact on
the appeals from that litigation to Utah's higher courts, is a
frightful prospect.

The Utah Supreme Court should take immediate

action to shut the floodgates.

18

POINT IV
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO RULE 46(d)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE CASE
DEFINITION OF "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT11 IS AN ISSUE OF FIRST
IMPRESSION FRAUGHT WITH PROFOUND PUBLIC POLICY RAMIFICATIONS.
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's
request for a Writ of Certiorari when "the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court."
Pursuant to Rule 46(d), the Utah Supreme Court should grant the
requested Writ of Certiorari and should review the Crosland
panel's attempt to redefine "permanent impairment," an issue of
first impression for Utah's appellate courts.

This redefinition

has extremely profound and wide-sweeping public policy
implications.
As discussed in Point III above, the Utah Court of
Appeals redefinition of "permanent impairment" will not only
spawn needless litigation, but it will likely have an extremely
adverse impact on Utah employers.

If the Crosland definition of

"permanent impairment" is used within the context of the higher
legal causation analysis under Allen, or for the purpose of
apportioning liability to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in the
context of permanent total disability claims, employers will be
forced to shoulder the burden of potentially exorbitant
19

disability awards based on medical conditions not caused by their
employees' industrial injuries.

The whole nature of how

employers do business in Utah will be fundamentally changed by
Crosland.

Utah employers may attempt to screen out employees who

have objectively definable (but nevertheless asymptomatic)
preexisting conditions.

This effort on the part of Utah

employers flies directly in the face of the public policy
traditionally advanced by Utah's Workers Compensation statutes
and Utah Supreme Court decisions like Capitano, supra, and
Holloway, supra.

Prior to Crosland. the express public policy

has been to encourage employers to hire workers who have
preexisting conditions—asymptomatic or otherwise—by ensuring
those employers that they will not be left economically
responsible for astronomical workers compensation disability
awards which relate entirely to preexisting conditions.

See,

Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977)
(Utah employers are not responsible for the payment of permanent
partial disability compensation either for manifested or
quiescent preexisting conditions).

In a nutshell, Crosland

completely undermines the well-established public policy of
Utah's workers compensation scheme.
For this reason, and the reasons set forth above, Crosland
should be reviewed on Certiorari and reversed.
20

Dated this

Zte^*^^75?2*tf—-,

1992.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON

Robert W. Brandt
Michael E. Dyer
Brad C. Betebenner
Michael A. Peterson

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, oi
day of May, 1992, to the following counsel of record:
James R. Black
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
General Counsel
Dennis V. Lloyd
560 South 300 East
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420
Virginius Dabney
Dabney & Dabney
350 South 400 East, Suite #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Angus Edwards
Purser, Okazaki & Berrett
39 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Benjamin A. Sims
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Heber Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~flJU*$ dp^—
wmap\CROSl.BRF
sm052O92
11553-002

22

ADDENDA

23

ADDENDUM A

CODE* CO
PTOVO. Utah

Crosland v. Board of Review

35

183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35

proficient in his work. General
knowledge or expertise acquired
through employment in a common
calling cannot be appropriated as a
trade secret. "The efficiency and
skills which an employee develops
through his work belong to him and
not to his former employer." Hallmark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v.
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d
933, 936 (1978). The same principles
apply to the covenant here. We
hold that the covenant not to
compete had the effect of preventing the defendant from exploiting
skills and experience which he had a
right to exploit.
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted).
The trial court and the majority ignore the
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have
made the requisite showing under Rule
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial
court can conclude that a covenant not to
compete is enforceable, it must first determine
that the employee was not engaged in a
common calling and that the employer has a
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at
627. A generalized assertion that preventing
the completion of a former employee will
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough.
Id. at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at
426.
In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a
salesman of butcher supplies. He was a route
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade
secrets. He was not involved in management.
As a result of his common calling, he necessarily knew both the actual and potential customers for the goods he sold in the communities of his territory. Customers of butcher
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a
scan of local telephone books would quickly
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are
not found on a secret customer list.
The majority does not even address the issue
of whether Benson was engaged in a common
calling. It rests solely on the specious rationale
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route
salespersons are commonly viewed in their
territories as representatives of their employers. But that is no reason to hold them in
semi-bondage to their former employers
when they change jobs. The majority notes
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. The law, however, does not protect
only less able individuals.
The consequence of the majority's ruling is
that a noncompetition covenant may be enforced against any route salesperson whenever
it could be said that the employer may lose

some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former
employee is not restrained from competing.
That, of course, can be said with respect to all
route salespersons, no matter how common
their callings.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be modified after it goes into effect. However, the law is
that a movant must first show some change in circumstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed circumstances that bear upon the issue of when the
injunction should have commenced.
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a professional person solely responsible for building the
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Gary E. CROSLAND,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial
Commission of Utah; Young Electric Sign
Co.; and Smith Administrators,
Respondents.
No. 910291-CA
FILED: March 20, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner
J. Angus Edwards, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Petitioner, Gary Crosland (Crosland), seeks
review of an Industrial Commission order
awarding him compensation for one-half of
his industrial accident injury and denying
compensation for the remainder. Crosland was
denied compensation for the half of the injury
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of
a preexisting asymptomatic condition. We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
On February 9, 1989, Crosland injured his
lower back as he attempted to help another
employee move a 200-pound sign while
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when,
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted
his upper torso. When he could barely walk
the next day at work, his employer sent him
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating
physician concluded that Crosland had a preexisting asymptomatic defect and that the
industrial accident caused the defect to become
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adjuster's examining physician determined that
Crosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spondylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis
(forward movement of the body of one of the
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below
it), adding that all the present symptoms
Crosland suffered were related to the industrial injury. Crosland had never had any back
problems or required medical treatment for his
back prior to this accident.
The medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that following the accident, Crosland had a twenty
percent permanent partial impairment of the
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the
industrial accident and half to the asymptomatic preexisting condition medically aggravated by the accident. The panel commented
that "[i]t is entirely possible he could have
gone on for an indefinite period had it not
been for the event described, but it is unlikely
he would have had the degree of difficulty had
he not had the developmental abnormality."
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied
Crosland compensation for the ten percent
permanent partial impairment attributable to
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggravated by the industrial accident, thus allowing compensation only for the ten percent
whole body permanent partial impairment
attributable to the industrial accident itself.
The Industrial Commission affirmed.
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should
receive compensation for the entire twenty
percent whole person permanent partial impairment caused by the industrial accident's
aggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic
condition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This proceeding is governed by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 &
Supp. 1991).! Section 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 ( 4 ) ( d )
governs the scope of our review of the Industrial Commission's order, allowing relief if
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced"
because "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." In Morton Int'l, Inc.
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991),
the supreme court held that under this section
we may review for correctness and need not
defer to the agency's interpretation unless

CODE•CO
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there is "a grant of discretion to the agency
concerning the language in question, either
expressly made in the statute or implied from
the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When
legislative intent can be discerned, however,
we give the agency's interpretation no deference. Id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of
Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App.
1991). This case requires an interpretation of
the 1988 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act and thus presents a question of
statutory construction and legislative intent
which we may review for correctness. Under
this higher standard, to afford relief we must
find that the Commission erroneously interpreted the law to Crosland's substantial prejudice.
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an
industrial injury and that he has satisfied both
the medical and legal cause requirements of
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).3 The sole issue on appeal is
whether Crosland should receive compensation
for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting
condition which was aggravated by his industrial accident and contributed to the injury.
Utah courts have followed the wellestablished common law rule that when an
industrial accident lights up or aggravates a
preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting
disability is compensable as long as the industrial accident was the medical and legal cause
of the injury. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Const,
and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah
1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum
to add the higher standard for legal
cause when preexisting conditions are involved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus.
Comm% 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App.
1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n,
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received
compensation for detached retina resulting
from work-related accident, even though
employee's prior cataract surgery rendered
him somewhat predisposed to retinal detachment). This rule is consistent with the stated
policy of liberally construing and applying the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of
affording financial security to injured employees. State Tax Comm'n
v. Industrial
Comm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984)
(citation omitted). In addition, the rule comports with Professor Larson's comments:
Nothing is better established in
compensation law than the rule
that, when industrial injury precipitates disability from a latent prior
condition, such as heart disease,
cancer, back weakness and the like,
the entire disability is compensable,
and except in states having special
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statutes on aggravation of disease,
no attempt is made to weigh the
relative contribution of the accident
and the preexisting condition to the
final disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in such cases,
nor in any case in which the prior
condition was not a disability in the
compensation sense.
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted).
Juxtaposed against this strong common law
background allowing an employee compensation for aggravation of a preexisting latent
condition is the policy of freeing an employer
from liability for an employee disability existing prior to the work-related accident. For
permanent partial impairments, this policy is
effectuated by the medical and legal causation |
requirements of Allen.4 In addition, by ame- !
ndment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature
added the following language to the Workers'
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid for any*
permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. §35-166 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic
weakness in Crosland's back was a
"permanent impairment" within the meaning
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The
stated purpose of this amendment to section
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial
disability compensation entitlements are based
on physical impairment caused by an industrial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no.
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to
include only conditions "[connoting] some
deterioration or diminishment in function."
This definition comports with the use of the
word "permanent impairment" at the beginning of amended section 35-1-66, stating,
with our emphasis, that an employee who
receives a "permanent impairment as a result
of an industrial accident ... may receive a
permanent partial disability award." This
wording implies functional "permanent impairment" and does not include asymptomatic
nonratable conditions.
This interpretation is also in line with decisions in other states, which have allowed for
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama
courts, for example, have refused to require
employees to accept reduced compensation for
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexisting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper
Co, v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity"
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced
compensation for employee with preexisting
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a
fundamental principle that an employer takefs]

the employee subject to his physical condition
when he starts his employment"); see also Terwilliger v. Green Fuel Economizer, Inc.,
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no
apportionment when preexisting condition was
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State
Workmen's
Compensation
Comm'r,
294
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment
must be definitely ascertained and rated;
general rule is that apportionment statutes do
not apply when "the prior condition was not
physically disabling").
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned
between the employer and the employee liability for symptoms resulting from one industrial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires
apportionment of liability for aggravation of
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find
that the amendment does more than to clarify
that an employer is free from liability for an
employee's preexisting ratable functional
impairment not caused by the industrial accident. Based on the usage of the term
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and
on Utah case law at the time of the injury,
which allowed full compensation for aggravation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition,
we believe the term "permanent impairment"
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable
physical condition exhibiting some diminished
function. Because Crosland's back was completely functional prior to the industrial accident and could have continued to be functional absent the accident, we conclude that
apportionment was inappropriate in this case
and that the Commission erroneously failed to
award full compensation for Crosland's
twenty percent whole person permanent partial
impairment caused by the industrial accident.
We reverse the order of the Industrial Commission.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

1. The UAPA governs all administrative proceedings
commenced after January 1, 1988.
2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied
when the terms of the statute leave the specific
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than
one permissible reading of the statute. The choice
among permissible interpretations might then be
deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we
would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse
of the delegated discretion. Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d
at 587-89.
3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of
Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury must show that his workrelated exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in
excess of the normally expected level of nonemployment activity for men and women in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26.
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting
Cite as
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion suffices to
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
prove legal cause. Id. (citing IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That
Crosland's exertion in lifting the sign was greater
IN TFiE
than normal is undisputed in this case. ConsequeUTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ntly, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen
rule under the amended statute.
Louise D. STROLLO,
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is
Plaintiff and Appellant,
accomplished by providing the employer contribuv.
tion from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See
David STROLLO,
note 6.
Defendant and Appellee.
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines the terms "impairment" and
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medic- No. 910237-CA
ally impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §35- FILED: March 23, 1992
1-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
"'Impairment' is a purely medical condition refle- Third District, Tooele County
cting any anatomical or functional abnormality or
loss." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991) Honorable David S. Young
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definit- ATTORNEYS:
ions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the David G. Challed, Salt Lalce City, for
Appellant
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on
the law as it existed at the time of the injury.
David Strollo, Tooele, Appellee Pro Se
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
employer and the Employers' Compensation Fund
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which,
This opinion is subject to revision before
with our emphasis, states in pertinent part,
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
If an employee, who has at least a WVo
whole person permanent impairment
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
from any cause or origin, subsequently
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a
incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse
of the employee's employment, and if
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring
the additional impairment results in
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We
permanent total disability, the employer
reverse.
or its insurance carrier and the EmploOn February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a
yers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for
complaint pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse
the payment of benefits as follows:...
This provision thus fully compensates an employee Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11
when an industrial accident and a preexisting imp- (1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex
airment result in permanent total disability, without pane protective order. Plaintiff's pro se
imposing the complete burden of compensation for complaint stated defendant threatened to kill
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of her if she served him with divorce papers.
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the
On February 28, 1991, both parties appeproblems arising when the sum of two injuries is
ared
in court without counsel. The judge
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already stated that he had reviewed the complaint
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total seeking a protective order. Before hearing any
disability), without discouraging employers from testimony, the judge stated he was going to
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is com- dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision,
pensated for the permanent total disability, but the the judge continued:
employer is partially compensated from the fund so
I understand that you may be in
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g.,
fear, but this is an improper use of
Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178
the
protective order. The protective
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal
order is intended to cover those
connection between the preexisting impairment and
circumstances where one is in, what
the industrial injury is not required; only that they
we call imminent fear. An imminent
cumulatively result in substantially greater disability); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
fear doesn't mean that you may
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award,
anticipate some future problem. It
the Commission relied upon Nyrchn v. Industrial
means that you are in fear of some
Comm% 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert,
present problem. That is if there is
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is
an immediate threat. This threat is
misplaced because the Nyrehn case merely apportbased upon your fear that if you
ions between the employer and the fund under this
file divorce papers that you may be
section and does not address the issue of apportioin jeopardy. You have every right
nment between the employer and the employee.
to file divorce papers. You have
every right in that proceeding to
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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porary disability lasts more than fourteen days, compensation shall also be payable for the first three
days after the injury is received.
1973

35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of
payments — State average weekly
wage defined.
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee
shall receive 66 2 ' } % of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
period of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.

(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of
each year, the total wages reported on contribution
reports to the department of employment security under the commission for the preceding calendar year
shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding year by
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used
as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom.
1981

35-1-65.1. Temporary partial
Amount of payments.

disability

—

(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 66^/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able
to earn after the accident, but not more than
100% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but
only up to a total weekly compensation that does
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of injury.

(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior to
eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
*a) whose physical condition resulting from
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and

294

(b) who files an application for hearing under
Section 35-1-99.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
1988

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of
payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99
may receive a permanent partial disability award
from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured
person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 662/3% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
such dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of
weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for
temporary total disability and temporary partial disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
(A) Upper extremity

Number of Weeks

(1) Arm

(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid
insertion
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below
elbow joint proximal to insertion of
biceps tendon
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon
(2) Hand
(a) At
wrist
or
midcarpal
or
midmetacarpal amputation
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
resection of carpometacarpal bone . . . .
(b) At interphalangeal joint
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
resection of metacarpal bone
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
resection of metacarpal bone
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
resection of metacarpal bone
< b) At proximal interphalangeal joint

218
187

178
168

168
101

67
50

42
34
18

34
27
15

17
13
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For the loss of
Number of Weeks
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
resection of metacarpal bone
8
fb) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less
below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump,
at knee joint or Gntti Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump
(three
inches
or
less
below
intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(n) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(in) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(n) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(m) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
dv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be
deemed equivalent to loss of the member Partial loss
or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the member This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed
[in] (B) (4)
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be
determined and paid as follows
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing
loss measured in decibels with frequencies of 500,
1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using
pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments
(ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing impairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies
above 3000 cycles per second shall not be considered
in determining compensable disability If the average
decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per
second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed by the
commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the
four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per
second which shall be added together and divided by
four to determine the average decibel loss To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the
average decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding
25 decibels shall be multiplied by VI2% up to the
maximum of 100% which is reached at 92 decibels
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying
the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by
five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the
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poorer ear and dividing by six The resulting figure is
the percentage of binaural hearing loss Compensation for permanent partial disabihtv for binaural
hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of
compensation benefits as provided in this chapter
Where an employee files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously
found to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent
award by the commission In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural
hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation
benefits
For an> permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided for m
the schedule of losses in this section, permanent par
tial disability compensation shall be awarded by the
commission based on the medical evidence Compen
sation for any such impairment shall, as closely as
possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the
schedule set forth in this section Permanent partia
disability compensation may not in any case exceec
312 weeks, which shall be considered the period 0
compensation for permanent total loss of bodily func
tion Permanent partial disability compensation maj
not be paid for any permanent impairment that ex
isted prior to an industrial accident
The amounts specified in this section are all subjec
to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amoun
payable as specified in this section, and in no even
shall more than a maximum of 662/3% of the stat
average weekly wage at the time of the injury for
total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to b
paid
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amoun
of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused b
an industrial accident, the employee shall receiv
compensation as outlined in this section Permaner
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires
finding by the commission of total disability, as me*
sured b> the substance of the sequential decisioi
making process of the Social Security Administratio
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations 1
revised The commission shall adopt rules that coi
form to the substance of the sequential decision-mal
ing process of the Social Security Administration u]
der 20 C F R Subsections 404 1520 (b), (c), (d), (€
and (f)(1) and (2), as revised
(2) For permanent total disability compensate
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compens
tion shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's averaj
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as f(
lows
(a) Compensation per week may not be mo
than 85% of the state average weekly wage at tl
time of the injury
(b) Compensation per week may not be le
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a c
pendent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent ch]
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum
four such dependent minor children, but not «
ceeding the maximum established in Subsecti
(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of t
employee at the time of the injury
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimi
weekly compensation rate under Subsection
shall be jb'< of the curr nt state average weH
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is ha
for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disabil
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(vin) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section
1988
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure [Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court], except that
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record
(I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record, or
(n) according to any other provision of
law
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute,
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution,
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law,
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure,
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification,
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court,
(h) the agency action is
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute,
UO contrary to a rule of the agency,
i 0 .on^iry
to the agency s prior practice, unlet>h the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
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onstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency, or
(IV) otherwise arbitrary or capricious
1988

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap
pellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute
(b) In granting relief, the court may
(I) order agency action required by law,
(n) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law,
(111) set aside or modify agency action,
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action, or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying
the stay, or
(b) (l) the party seeking judicial review is likely
to prevail on the merits when the court
finally disposes of the matter,
(n) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief,
(in) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings, and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety,
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances
1987
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement.
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
to obtain civil enforcement
(cj Venue ior an action >eetung civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be determined by
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Chapter 1

Concepts
of Impairment
Evaluation
1.0 Introduction
he AMA Guides to the Evaluation ofPermanent
Impairment (the Guidei) provides a reference
framework within which physicians may evaluate and report medical impairment and within which
nonmedical recipients of information about impairment
may understand and make appropriate use of the medical information they receive
The unique value of the Guides astf*£technical
reference of choice for evaluation of medical impairment, which goes well beyond its broad scope of coverage (all body parts and systems), anses from the precise
application of fundamental medical and scientific
concepts, the systematic analysis that introduces each
of the clinical chapters, the detail of the medical evaluation protocols, and the thorough state-of-the-art analyses that underlie the rating tables In addition, a format
for reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized
at the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide
straightforward and well-structured guidelines so that
reports about the same individual from different observers are likely to be of comparable content and completeness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed
and compared
As is true of any other technical process, knowing
the "rules," which in the case of the Guides are the
specific procedures described in the clinical chapters,
is not enough The user of the Guides, both physicians
and nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts
under which the "rules" have been developed and the
intended approach for using them to achieve objective,
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accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individuals with medical impairment This chapter and Chapter
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment
embodied in the Guides

1.1 Basic Considerations
Impairment-Disability-Handicap
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment"
"disability" and "handicap," appear in laws, regulations
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordination of the ways in which they are used It is no wonder,
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about
their meaning The definitions used m the Guides seek
to remedy this confusion through detailed description
and delineation of the domain in which each term is
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that
are important, not the word used as the label Accordingly even when the terminology of the Guides may
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a
particular law, regulation or administrative system, analysis of the context in accordance with the following
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within
the provisions of a particular disability system
The accurate and proper use of medical information to assess impairment in connection with disability
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas

impairment is a medical matter, disability arises out
of the interaction between impairment and external
demands. Consequently, as used in the Guides,
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's
health status that is assessed by medical means; "disability," which is assessed by nonmedical means,
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet
personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet
statutory or regulatory requirements. Simply stated,
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an
individual; "disability" is the gap between what the
individual can do and what the individual needs or
wants to do.
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessarily "disabled." Impairment gives rise to disability only
when the medical condition limits the individual's capacity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields
and activities.1 On the other hand, if the individual is
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment.
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet independent of, both "impairment" and "disability" although
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of
these terms. Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that individual has an impairment that substantially limits one
or more life activities, including work, has a record of
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment.3 The terms of this definition are so indefinite and broad that, technically, almost any person who
desires to do so might be included in the class of the
handicapped under the law.
As a matter of practicality, however, a "handicap"
may be operationally understood as being manifest in
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional
activity. An individual with limited functional capacity
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by
compensating in some way for the effects of an impairment. Such compensation, or, more technically,
"accommodation," normally entails the use of assistive
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids,
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equipment), modification of the environment, and/or modification of tasks or activities (such as increased time for
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks). Any
1. The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth
finger of the left hand illustrates the point. If the individual is a bank
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other
hand, a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled.
2. The Rehabilitauon Act of 1973.

one these modalities, or all in combination, may be
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome
a barrier to an objective. If the individual is not able
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation,
or if there is no accommodation that will enable the
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handicapped, the individual is also disabled. On the other
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish
a task or activity without accommodation is, with
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped
nor disabled.
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the
importance of examining the context in which the terms
"impairment," "disability," or "handicap" appear to avoid
being misled by imprecise usage. For example, reference to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides,
an evaluation of impairment The physician does not
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the
purpose of paying a disability benefit.

Employability—Management/
Administrative Considerations
The concept of "employability" deserves special attention, for in an occupational setting, if an individual,
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the
job demands and conditions of employment as defined
by the employer, the individual is employable, and,
consequendy, not disabled. As an operational matter,
employability is critically related to an individual's
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the
employer is willing to pay wages. If the individual has
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment,
then the individual is not disabled for that job. When
these capacities are called into question, for whatever
reason, the employer must carry out an "employability
determination."
As in determination of disability, there are both
administrative and medical components to the employability determination, the process by which an employer
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suitability for employment. On the administrative side,
management will specifically assess performance capability to estimate the likelihood of a performance failure
3. The law does not make clear by whom the individual must be
"regarded" as being handicapped. There are cases on record in which an
employer "accommodated" the individual even though there was no
clear evidence or record of medical impairment. In these cases, it was
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the
law because the employer, by offering accommodation, had regarded the
individual as handicapped.

as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability in
case of human failure If neither likelihood of failure is
too great, then the individual is considered to be employable in a particular job This represents a fundamental
"go" or "no go" determination that there is or is not a
sufficient match between an individual and the job
requirements to give further consideration to employment It is different from a "desirability" determination,
which would rank and compare the individuals who
are employable
During the course of employment, there is
on-going reassessment of an individual's employabihty
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and attendance Employment continues until the employee leaves
voluntarily or until a change gives rise to a deficiency
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that retention in the job can no longer be justified When an
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disabled, because of a change m health, or alleges that a
medical condmon has caused a service deficiency, the
employer has little choice but to conduct an employability determination and to assess the individual's
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and
to perform assigned tasks and duties Disability, then, is
the default result when it is determined that the individual lacks employabihty

Employability-Medical Considerations
As noted above, an employable individual has the capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and to
perform assigned tasks and duties On the other hand,
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is
unwilling, to travel to and from work, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable
The issue of disability arises from the critical questions
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, traveling to and from work, being at work, or performing
assigned tasks and duties The answer is found in a
"medical determination related to employabihty"
The first critical task in carrying out a medical
determination related to employabihty is to learn about
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliability, availability productivity, expected duration of useful service life and any other criteria associated with
qualification and suitability Sufficiently detailed information from a job analysis will provide a basis upon
which a physician determines exactly what kinds of
medical information are needed, and to what degree of

detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to
demand criteria Once the medical information needs
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evaluation protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information
However, a special medical evaluation may not be
necessary, for, presumably, an individual who alleges
disability would already be under the care of a personal
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition
is interfering with life activities on or off the job And,
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof, the
place to start, then, is with review of medical information already available in the form of medical office and
hospital records Through this medium, the physician
making the determination of employabihty may communicate with the personal physician to learn whatever
is known about that individual's health so that, in accordance with established medical diagnostic criteria and
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the
two physicians may come to agreement about what is
and is not known medically about the patient and determine what other information is necessary to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty This is nothing more or
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative
management of their patients The practice of medicine
is not an adversary process, and, consequently, by
relying on communications and decisionmaking procedures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of
impairment and medical determinations related to
employabihty may be managed without confrontation
between them With respect to employabihty, then, the
medical questions to be answered are whether or not
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency,
whether or not the documentation provides reason to
believe that the medical condition has either caused or
contributed to the deficiency
If review of the documentation does not show
that the individual has met the required burden of
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide
whether or not acquisition of additional medical information is likely to enable the individual to do so Or,
there may be a need to verify clinical findings contained in the documentation provided If so, the medical evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medical evaluation by any physician, for, in general, two
4 If the medical condition does not for example preclude daily travel to
and from a physical therapy clinic then it would be unlikely for the
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work Or if an
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying groceries from doing chores around the house or from going to the movies,
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condition
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace
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physicians examining the same patient under the same
protocol will have approximately the same set of
findings. Taken with the prior information, the results
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclusions that can then be compared with the demand
criteria for the job. This can always be done with credibility and confidence, since the specifications for the
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to
begin with.
When approached in this way, the medical input
into the employability determination will be quite independent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack
of it. Moreover, because this process provides medical
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need
never occur.

1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides
Since any person has only one health status and only
one life situation, given enough information about each,
it is possible to understand the relationship and interaction between them. Moreover, because the evaluation
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but
culminates the evolution of changes in health that result
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical
information with the results of a current clinical evaluation, carried out in accordance with the protocols of the
Guides, to characterize fully and assess medical impairment. Accomplishment of this objective is based on
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the
fundamental components of the Guides.
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the
kinds of information needed to document the nature of
an impairment and its consequences, specifies procedures for acquiring the information, and defines a structured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting
the information. A summary of these requirements and
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical
chapter.
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, function, or system, each developed by recognized medical
specialty consultants. These protocols are defined in
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient
information to describe fully and characterize the current clinical status of a medical impairment.
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols. If

the protocols and tables have been followed, the clinical findings may be compared directly to the criteria
and related to a percentage of impairment with
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the
determination.
Operationally, the key to effective and reliable
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical
medical office and hospital records maintained by the
physicians who have provided care and treatment since
the onset of the medical condition. Such records comprise clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge
summaries, operative notes, pathology reports, laboratory test reports and the results of special tests and
diagnostic procedures. Before formal evaluation is carried out under the Guides, analysis of the history and
course of the medical condition, beginning with the
circumstances of onset, and including findings on previous examinations, the course of treatment, responses
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an
impairment is permanent and well stabilized
This information gathering and analysis serves as
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a permanent impairment is carried out. It is most important that
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary
to characterize fully the medical condition in accordance with requirements of the Guide?, an incomplete
or partial evaluation is not acceptable. Once this task is
accomplished, the clunical findings may be compared
to the clinical information already contained in the
records about the individual. If the current findings
are found to be consistent with the results of previous
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then,
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as
appropriate or required, with the reference tables to
determine the percentage rating of the impairment.
However, if the findings are not in substantial accordance with the information of record, then, until further clinical evaluation resolves the disparities, the
rating step is meaningless and cannot be carried out.
This approach takes advantage of the fact that
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with
each other orally and in writing to determine what they
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine
further what additional information they need to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty. It does not make sense,
therefore, to manage cases in which there are differing
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical
third party to adjudicate an issue of medical fact! Such
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differences are best handled through the ordinary process of everyday patient management. Then, with reference to the past medical documentation, the medical
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physician and nonphysician users of the Guides may verify
that sufficient medical information has been assembled
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment,
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to support a rating in accordance with the tables. At that
point, it is a straightforward matter to verify whether or
not a numerical rating of impairment is substantiated
in accordance with the criteria contained in the Guides.

1.3 Medical Impairment and
Workers' Compensation
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either
sustains an injury or incurs an illness arising in the
course of and out of employment is entitled to protection against financial loss without being required to
sue the employer. In exchange for their having lost the
right to sue, the workers' compensation system guarantees benefits to all workers who are covered under the
law and who meet the criteria for award of benefits.
The types of payments that may be made when a
claim is approved fall into three categories:
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages
due to temporary total disability;
• payment of medical bills; and
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent
disability, partial or total.
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as
being related to functional capability or the lack of it.
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is
to be compensated monetarily.
Payments are made for temporary total disability
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to
work is expected, and the medical condition has not
stabilized.5 Temporary disability is partial when the individual returns to work but is not earning at the prior
level.
5. In accordance with the earlier discussion, "temporary total disability"
occurs when the medical condiuon precludes the individual from traveling to and from work, being at work, and performing assigned tasks and
duties.

A permanent disability award is normally independent of the individual's capacity to work and is
formulated in terms of expected or presumed long-term
or permanent economic loss associated with a permanent medical impairment, such as an amputation. Such
an award may be paid according to a schedule that
specifically associates impairment with certain body
parts, functions, or systems; examples are amputations,
loss of sight, and loss of hearing, and a schedule is
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average
weekly wages.
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a
law, in recognition that the "loss of" or "loss of use of"
the body part, function, or system may be less than
total, requires determination of the proportion or percentage of loss. For example, in Maryland, the law says:
In all cases where there has been an amputation
of a part of any member of the body herein specified, or the loss ofuse ^/(emphasis added) any
part thereof...the Commission shall allow compensation for such proportion of the total number of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss
of use of the entire member as the affected or
amputated portion bears to the whole.6
Moreover, because not all conditions that can arise
out of an injury are accounted for in a schedule, back
injuries, for example, there is likely to be a provision of
the law similar to the following:
In all other cases of disability other than those
specifically enumerated disabilities7...which disability is partial in character, but permanent in
quality, the Commission shall determine the portion or percentage by which the industrial use of
the employee's body was impaired as a result of
the injury and in determining such portion or
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industrial
loss, the Commission shall take into consideration, among other things, the nature of the
physical injury, the occupation, experience,
training, and age of the injured employee, and
shall award compensation in such proportion
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks...9
(emphasis added)
6. Workmen's Compensauon Law of Maryland, Annotated, 1983, Art.
101, §36(3).
7. Note the context with which "disability" and "disabilies" are used.
Clearly, the terms should be read as "impairment" and "impairments."
8. Should this read "disability"?
9. Ibid. Art. \0\,36(4)(a).
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While medical information is necessary for the decision
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that
information. Neither in this example nor in general is
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical
condition may be combined with knowledge of the
other factors to calculate the percentage by which
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired.
Accordingly, each commissioner or hearmg official must
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assessment of the available medical and nonmedical
information.
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating
needs to define its own process for translating knowledge of a medical condition into an estimate of the
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet statutory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the
impairment. We encourage each system not to make
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability,
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not
intended.
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical
information with more than a number that represents a
percentage of impairment. To the extent that the physician provides a comprehensive medical picture in the
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure
1), the user of the information will be able to determine
how the medical information fits with all the other
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true understanding of the impact of the medical impairment on
the claimant's future employability.
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that the parties agreed to purchase and sell
parcel one based on the physical boundaries of the parcel and decided on a price
for that parcel without regard to the acreage of parcel one.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Kathleen NYREHN, Petitioner,
v.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Fred
Meyer Stores and/or Liberty Mutual
Insurance, Respondents.
No. 900010-CA.
Utah Court of Appeals.
Oct. 25, 1990.
Worker sought review of denial of
workers' compensation benefits.
The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1)
worker who did not appeal from administrative law judge's order in her favor could
raise claims of error with respect to his
findings which were adverse to her when
her employer appeals, and (2) worker established legal causation with respect to back
injury, notwithstanding her preexisting injury.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1846
Worker was not required to appeal
from adverse rulings of administrative law
judge who entered an order in her favor in
order to assert as appellee on appeal that
those findings were erroneous.
2. Workers' Compensation <s=»1939.7
Court is not required to give deference
to conclusions of Industrial Commission on
grounds that Commission has expertise and
familiarity with the work environment, al-

though there may be some complex work
activities which require deference to the
Commission's evaluation of whether workrelated exertion exceeds the exertion of
nonemployment life.
3. Workers' Compensation <§=>554
Administrative law judge may not simply presume that finding of preexisting
condition warrants application of the Allen
test for determining whether there is a
causal relation between work and injury.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=»554
Finding that worker's preexisting condition contributed to injury may not be
implied.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
®=*763
Failure of agency to make adequate
findings of &£t on material issues renders
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless
the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of only one conclusion.
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>552
Legal causation test to be applied to
workers who suffer from preexisting condition is not meant to prevent workers with
preexisting conditions from recovering benefits; higher standard of legal causation is
intended to offset the preexisting condition
of the employee as a likely cause of injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impairments
resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>517
When accident is climax of repeated
exertions, the work-related exertion is, for
purposes of proving legal causation, the
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that established the accident; in determining whether there is causation, court
must consider the whole burden on the
camel, and not just the straw that breaks
the camel's back.
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>1542
Although worker suffered from preexisting back condition, evidence that, for two
and one-half months, she was required to
lift tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a
day showed that she engaged in activity
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which was not typical of nonemployment
activity and thus showed causation with
respect to her back injury.
William W. Downes, Jr., David Eckersley
(argued), Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Brad C. Betebenner, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson,
Salt Lake City, for Fred Meyer Stores.
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (argued), Salt Lake City, for Employers Reinsurance Fund.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
CONDER \ JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for
review of the Industrial Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits. We
reverse.
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included
pricing and sorting merchandise contained
in tubs which were approximately 2V2 feet
wide, 2V2 feet long, and IV2 to 2 feet tall.
The tubs weighed between fifteen and forty pounds each, depending on the contents,
and were stacked upon each other. Nyrehn would lift and carry the tubs to and
from a sorting area approximately thirty to
thirty-six times a day. In addition to lifting the tubs, Nyrehn was involved in constant bending and stooping to sort merchandise into different tubs. On January
23, 1985, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Nyrehn felt a gradual onset of pain in her
lower back while performing her duties at
work. Despite the pain she continued to
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990).
2. In concluding that Nyrehn had not satisfied
the Allen test, the A.L.J. stated that he followed
the "legal doctrine" of Smith <fir Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (lifting 47lA pounds by itself did not
constitute an unusual exertion). Nyrehn argues
that this statement indicates that the A.L.J.
based his conclusion on weight alone, which is
inappropriate. American Roofing Co. v. Indus.

work. The pain worsened until she finally
had to leave work early at approximately
4:00 p.m. After three back operations, Nyrehn's pain persisted and she was still unable to work. She therefore sought permanent disability benefits.
After a hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of January 23, 1985 was not the result of a certain
incident or activity, but rather the result of
"two and [a] half months of lifting tubs of
merchandise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2)
Nyrehn had an asymptomatic pffpyicHngr
condition, spondylolysis (disintegration or
dissolution of a vertebra); and (3) 75% of
Nyrehn's total permanent impairment existing at examination was "caused by the
industrial accident of January 23, 1985,"
and 25% was due to "preexisting incapacity
of spondylolysis.."
The A.L.J. also made the following relevant conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured
her lower back "by accident" in that her
injury was neither planned nor foreseen;
(2) there was a direct medical causal relationship between the industrial accident
and Nyrehn's back problems; (3) due to her
preexisting condition, Nyrehn was required
to prove legal causation under Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986); and (4) Nyrehn's job duties of lifting
tubs of merchandise weighing between fifteen and forty pounds did not amount to
unusual or extraordinary exertion in excess
of the normally expected level of nonemployment activity for men and women in
the latter half of the twentieth century as
required in Allen.2
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed
to satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J. awarded Nyrehn permanent total disability beneComm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Fred Meyer, on the other hand, argues that the
A.LJ. considered the total circumstances since
at the conclusion of the hearing he referred to
various factors besides the weight of the tubs,
including the repetitive nature of the lifting.
Since we base our decision on other grounds,
we need not determine whether the A.LJ. erroneously applied a bright-line test rather than
consider the totality of the circumstances as
required by Smith & Edwards.
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fits. He refused to apply Allen because he
felt that the test was at odds with other
Utah Supreme Court cases indicating that
handicapped workers should not be placed
in a hardship in receiving compensation
benefits. He also indicated that he believed the Allen test to be unconstitutional
because it set a different standard for such
handicapped workers.
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial
Commission to review the A.LJ.'s award.
On review, the Commission adopted the
factual findings of the A.L.J. and his conclusion that Nyrehn failed to prove legal
causation as required under Allen. The
Commission then reversed the A.LJ.'s
award of benefits, indicating that despite
the A.LJ.'s concerns over the constitutionality of the Allen test, the Commission was
required to apply the test. The Commission concluded that inasmuch as Nyrehn
failed to satisfy the Allen test she was not
entitled to benefits. Nyrehn then petitioned this court to review the Industrial
Commission's order.
WAIVER OF APPEAL
[1] Fred Meyer argues that Nyrehn has
waived her right to challenge the A.LJ.'s
finding that she did not prove legal causation because she did not file her own motion for review of that finding with the
Commission.3 Fred Meyer erroneously relies on Pease v. Industrial
Commission,
694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). In Pease, the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the following provision: "(1) Any party in interest
who is dissatisfied with the order entered
by an administrative law judge or the commission may file a motion for review of
3. In essence, Fred Meyer urges us to adopt the
following rule: If an A.L.J. makes a possibly
erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law
that is contrary to the prevailing party, but
which did not prevent the party from prevailing,
that party must nevertheless seek review in order to preserve any challenge of the possibly
erroneous finding/conclusion in the event the
losing party moves for review.
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(2) (Supp.1990)
provides:

such
order."
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 35-1-82.53(1) (Supp.1983) (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded that
when an applicant files for review under
this section, he must raise all possible issues or the issues not raised would be
considered waived. Id. at 616. There is no
indication in Pease that a prevailing party
has an affirmative duty to seek review
from faulty findings. Nor do we perceive
any such duty in the language of the statute which is clearly permissive.
Although the conclusion of the A.L.J.
regarding legal causation may have been
faulty, any such error was rendered harmless to Nyrehn by the subsequent award of
benefits. If Fred Meyer had not filed for
review, she would have had her benefits.
Nyrehn simply did not have any reason to
appeal until the Commission denied her
benefits. Cf. Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d
643, 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a
party has with the judgment as it was
entered—not grievances it might acquire
depending on the outcome of the appeal.").
In petitioning this court to review the denial of benefits, Nyrehn is seeking review of
the Commission's conclusion that she did
not prove legal causation. She is not seeking review of the A.LJ.'s conclusion. The
issue of whether Nyrehn proved legal causation is therefore properly before us.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Inasmuch as these proceedings were
commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the
effective date of the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA), we look to the prior case law to determine the proper standard of review.4
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial review that
are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced
by or before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings are
still pending before an agency or a court on
January 1, 1988.
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review of agency findings of fact, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Commission, 776 P.2d 63, 66-68 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
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As to findings of fact, our review is
• deferential. "[T]he reviewing court's inquiry is whether the Commission's findings
are 'arbitrary or capricious,' or 'wholly
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence' or
without 'any substantial evidence' to support them. Only then should the Commission's findings be displaced." Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah
1981).
As to the Commission's conclusion that
Nyrehn's work-related exertion did not satisfy the Allen test, our review is more
searching:
The question of whether the employment activities of a given employee are
sufficient to satisfy the legal standard of
unusual or extraordinary effort involves
two steps. First the agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what
were the employment-related activities of
the injured employee. Second, the agency must decide whether those activities
amounted to unusual or extraordinary
exertion. This second determination is a
mixed question of law and fact.
Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986).
[2] Our standard of review of mixed
questions of law and fact is an intermediate review for reasonableness and rationality. "The degree of deference extended
to the decisions of the Commission on these
intermediate types of issues has been given
various expressions, but all are variations
of the idea that the Commission's decisions
must fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality." Sisco Hilte v. Indus.
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review
of mixed questions of law and fact, see Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).
5. Fred Meyer urges us to give considerable deference to the conclusions of the Commission
because of its "expertise in and familiarity with
the work environment." Price River Coal, 731
P.2d at 1084. The deference we accord an agency's disposition under intermediate review fluctuates with the importance of the agency's expertise in determining the issue at hand:
The more likely it is that agency expertise will
assist in resolving an issue, the more deference courts should give to the agency's resolu-
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Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Utah Dept. of Admin.
Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d
601, 610 (Utah 1983)).
"[Reasonableness must be determined
with reference to the specific terms of
the underlying legislation, interpreted in
light of its evident purpose as revealed in
the legislative history and in light of the
public policy sought to be served." This
standard appears to give us some flexibility in reviewing the otherwise objective standard that must be applied by the
Commission.
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n,
770 P.2d 1016, 1018 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
(quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs., 658
P.2d at 611).5
"Furthermore, ta facilitate the purposes
of the legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and any
doubt as to compensation is to be resolved
in favor of the applicant." USX Corp. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Kaiser Steel Corp., 631 P.2d
at 892; McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, 567
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).
Guided by these standards we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant application of the higher
Allen test for legal causation and whether
the Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn
failed to prove legal causation was a reasonable and rational conclusion.
RECOVERY OF BENEFITS
In order to recover workers' compensation benefits, an employee must prove that
she was injured "by accident arising out of
tion. The less pertinent agency insight is—or
the more likely it is that judicial expertise will
be most helpful—the less deference need be
paid by reviewing courts to the agency's disposition.
Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 115 P.2d
432, 434 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
We recognize that there may be some complex work activities that require deference to
the Commission's evaluation of whether the
work-related exertion exceeds the exertion of
nonemployment life, but in general the Commission is no better suited to compare simple
forms of work-related exertion than are we
since "normal nonemployment life" is not within the Commission's- area of expertise.
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or in the course of [her] employment."
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). "This
statutory language creates two prerequisites for a finding of compensable injury.
First, the injury must be 'by accident/
Second, the language 'arising out of or in
the course of employment' requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment." Allen, 729
P.2d at 18. The Utah Supreme Court held
in Allen that a claimant must supply proof
of both "legal" and "medical" causation.
"Under the legal test, the law must define
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of
'arising out of the employment' . . . [then]
the doctors must say whether the exertion
(having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this [injury]." Larson, Workmen's Compensation
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277 (1986) quoted in
Alien, 729 P.2d at 25.
To meet the legal causation requirement,
a claimant with a preexisting condition
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase
the risk [she] already faced in everyday
life because of [her] condition. This additional element of risk in the work-place
is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion serves to
offset the preexisting condition of the
employee as a likely cause of the injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk
rather than exertions at work.
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.6
Therefore, the only two issues 7 before
us are (1) whether Nyrehn was "suffering
6. This standard is often referred to as the higher
standard of Allen since, "[w]here there is no
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient [to prove legal causation]."
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Compare Hone v. IF.
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986) (exertion of
putting on heavy pair of coveralls was sufficient
when claimant did not have any preexisting
back problems).
7. Fred Meyer does not challenge the A.LJ.'s
finding that Nyrehn was injured "by accident."
Nor does it challenge the conclusion of the
A.LJ. that the industrial accident was the medical cause of Nyrehn's disability.
8. The A.LJ. did find—for purposes of allocating
liability between the employer and the Employ-

from a preexisting condition which contribute^] to the injury/' Allen, 729 P.2d at 26,
and (2) did the work-related exertion which
caused Nyrehn's injury exceed the "usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Id. "If such a finding is
made, then the requirement of legal cause
is satisfied because it is presumed that the
employment increased the risk of injury to
which that worker was otherwise subject in
[her] nonemployment life." Price River
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082.
Preexisting Condition
[3] An A.LJ. may not simply presume
that the finding of a preexisting condition
warrants application of the Allen test. An
employer must prove medically that the
claimant "suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. See, e.g., Price River
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082 (evidence proved
that preexisting conditions "contributed
greatly" to heart attack); Worker's Compensation Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 761
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (claimant suffered from narcolepsy and emphysema and
had a 36-year smoking habit, but no prior
history of heart disease, Allen test therefore did not apply when claimant died of
heart attack).
[4,5] The factual findings of the Commission are silent as to whether Nyrehn's
preexisting back condition contributed to
the industrial injury.8 The A.L.J, had
merely concluded as a matter of law that
ers' Reinsurance Fund—that 75% of the total
permanent impairment existing at the time of
the examination was "caused by the industrial
accident of January 23, 1985," and 25% was due
to "pre-existing incapacity." Such an allocation,
however, is not proof that the preexisting condition somehow contributed to the injury of January 23, 1985, it only addresses the end result,
i.e., the total disability at the time of the examination. See, e.g., Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987) (5% impairment existed prior to accident, 7l/2% impairment existed following accident, therefore only
2VM attributed to the accident); cf. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1130
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (permanent impairment resulted solely from the preexisting conditions
and not from the industrial accident or any
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"[s]ince Ms. Nyrehn brought a pre-existing
low back condition to the workplace,'' the
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal
conclusion is the critical factual finding
that Nyrehn's preexisting condition contributed to her injury. Such material findings,
however, may not be implied. In order for
us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)). The
failure of a trial court to make adequate
findings is reversible error. Id. Likewise,
the failure of an agency to make adequate
findings of fact oh material issues renders
its findings "arbitrary and capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted
and capable of only one conclusion/' Id.
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1983)).
Since we conclude that Nyrehn's work-related exertion satisfied even the higher
standard for proving legal causation, the
Commission's failure to make adequate
findings of fact was harmless. We therefore need not address whether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the Commission's implied finding.
Legal Causation
[6] The legal causation test adopted in
Allen is not meant to prevent workers with
preexisting conditions from recovering benefits.9 "Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by
an industrial accident is compensable
. . . . ' " Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (quoting
Powers v. Indus. Comm % 19 Utah 2d 140,
143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (footnote
omitted)).
combination of the accident with the preexisting
conditions).
9. "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers' Compensation Act

The higher standard of legal causation
adopted in Allen is intended to "offset the
preexisting condition of the employee as a
likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from
a personal risk rather than exertions at
work.11 Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis
added). See also Price River Coal Co., 731
P.2d at 1082 (legal causation test "is designed to screen out those injuries that
result from a personal condition . . . rather
than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace"); Hone v. J.F.
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986)
(legal causation test is to distinguish between an injury which is "more likely than
not produced by a risk related to the employment from one that is caused by a
personal risk" (emphasis added)); Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah
1987) (the fact that heart attack occurred
at work was a mere coincidence).
"[T]he key question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to
the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. In
order to answer this inquiry, we must first
determine what "exertion" is at issue: the
simple lifting of one tub of merchandise, or
the repetitive lifting of many such tubs
over an extended period of time.
The Commission found that Nyrehn's
pain resulted from "two and a half months
of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36
times a day." The industrial accident,
therefore, was not a single incident of lifting one tub of merchandise; it was the
climax of repetitive lifting. The Utah Supreme Court has broadly defined "accident" to include injuries which are the result of repetitive exertion.
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
liberally and in favor of employee coverage
when statutory terms reasonably admit such a
construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,
796 P.2d 676 (1990).
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preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such a
manner as to properly fall within the
definition of an accident as just stated
above.
Carling v. Indus. Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d
260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) quoted with approval in Allen, 729 P.2d at 18.
[7] When an accident is the climax of
repeated exertions, as in Nyrehn's case,
work-related "exertion," for purposes of
proving legal causation, is the aggregate
exertion of the repetitive exertions that
establish the accident. See Miera v. Indus.
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986)
(claimant's repetitive "jumps into an eightfoot hole [by way of] a four-foot platform
at thirty-minute intervals constitute a considerably greater exertion than that encountered in non-employment life").-. In
other words, we must consider the whole
burden on the camel and not just the straw
that breaks the camel's back. See Smith
& Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (must consider all factors related to exertion); Workers'
Compensation Fund, 761 P.2d at 575
(comparing cumulative effect of several
factors, including driver's fatigue, anxiety,
and the stress of driving through a snow
storm, with the exertion of nonemployment
life).
In Allen, the supreme court listed the
following examples of typical nonemployment activities: "taking full garbage
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an
automobile, lifting a small child to chest
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. While lifting
a tub of merchandise weighing between 15
and 40 pounds once or twice could likewise
fit into the list of examples above, lifting
such a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and
a half months is not a typical nonemployment activity. The foregoing moderately strenuous activities which may not be
considered unusual when performed once
or twice may nevertheless amount to unusual exertion when performed repeatedly.
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage
handlers, auto mechanics, childcare provid-

ers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing
examples.
[8] In the case before us it is unquestionable that two and a half months of
lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a
day would cause unusual and extraordinary
wear and tear on a body when compared
with the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729
P.2d at 26. The test is not whether the
type of exertion which caused the injury is
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather
whether the cumulative work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of exertion in
nonemployment life. We doubt that there
are many physical activities outside of the
workplace where this type of effort is being repeated so often over such a significant period of time.
The Commission's finding that Nyrehn's
work-related exertion was not an unusual
exertion was comparable to a conclusion
that the typical nonemployment activities
of people in today's society includes lifting
a full garbage can 30 to 36 times per day
each working day for two and a half
months. Merely stating the comparison
shows the fallacy of the Commission's finding. Nyrehn's back injury was not a coincidental injury which appeared at work without any enhancement from the workplace.
"[Her] employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk [she] already faced in everyday life because of
[her] condition." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.
The Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn
failed to prove legal causation was therefore not reasonable and rational.
CONCLUSION
Nyrehn's repetitive lifting of the tubs
over an extended period of time was an
unusual exertion as compared with the
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.
We therefore conclude that Nyrehn proved
legal causation. The Commission's order
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denying Nyrehn her workers' compensation
benefits is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to grant Nyrehn benefits for total permanent disability as calcu-

800 P 2d—9

lated by the, A.L.J. Costs on review to
petitioner,
GARFF and CONDER, JJ., concur.

